The Dynamic Effects of Tax Law Asymmetries by Alan J. Auerbach
NBER WORKINGPAPERSERIES
THEDYNAMIC EFFECTS OF TAXLAW ASYMMETRIES
Alan J. AuerbaCh
Working Paper No. 1152





here is part of theNBER's research program
in Taxation and projectin Govern1nt Budget.Any opinions
expressed are thoseof the author andnotthose of the National
Bureau of EconomiCResearch.NBER Working Paper 1/1152
June 1983
Abstract
THEDYNAMIC EFFECTS OF TAXLAWASYMTRIES
Under currentU.S. tax law, a distinction is made between gains and losses
by businesses. Losses that must be "carried forward" are subject to two
penalties: a loss of interest, and expiration after fifteen years. Previous
examinations have focused on the higher expected tax payments such a tax system
without "full loss offset" imposes on risky projects.
Thispaper presents a dynamicanalysis of the impact of taxation on
investmentwhen gains and losses are treated asymmetrically. The results
providea basis for analyzing recent tax changes, particularly the controversial
"safe—harbor leasing" provisions of the 1981 tax legislation.
Alan J.Auerbach





Under current U.S. tax law, a distinction is made between gains and
losses by businesses. For corporations, gains are taxed at what is
essentially a flat rate of 46percent,while losses do not necessarily
qualify for a refund at the same rate. To obtain an immediate refund, the
taxpayer must have had taxable income during the three previous years in
excess of the current loss. ny losses that cannot be "carried back't in this
fashion must be "carried forward," subject to two implicit penalties: such
loss"carryforwards" earn no interest, and they expire after fifteen years.
Hence, businesses investing in risky projects for which the probability of
having to carry losses forward is nonzero can expect to pay higher taxes than
they would under a system with full "loss offset," i.e. the immediate refund
of taxes for losses incurred.
Previous examinations of the effects ofthelack ofafull loss offset
havefocused on risk—taking in a static model. Doinar and Musgrave (1944)
first pointed out the disincentive imposed when the government does not share
in "downside" risks. Similar analysis was done by Stiglitz (1969) for a
state preference model. Compared to a model with full loss offset, a tax
system which refunds losses at a lower rate than the one at which gains are
taxed causes risky assets to have both a lower expected return and a higher
variance, while having no effect on the return to safe assets. Hence, risk
takingis discouraged.
ManyU.S. corporations experience the need to carry losses forward.1
This problem became more acute with the acceleration of depreciation
allowances under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, for two—2—
reasons. First, the acceleration resulted in a reduction in effective rates,
to the point where,even for safe assets with positive returns, certain
equity—financed investments faced negative effective taxes rates.2 That is,
under a hypothetical tax system with full loss offset, the present value of
taxes associated with such investments would be negative. Moreover, the
timing of depreciation allowances meant that, even for assets with positive
expected tax payments in present value, the pattern over time would be tax
refunds in the early years, caused by large depreciation allowances, followed
by tax payments in later years. Firms with a high ratio of new assets to old
could not expect actually to get such refunds, and by having to carry them
forward would face higher total tax payments, in present value. Again, this
result is for safe assets with positive annual income. Such problems would
necessarily carry over and, indeed, probably be worse if one considered risky
investments.
As a response to these problems, the 1981 legislation also included a
liberalization of equipment leasing provisions. Under the new "safe harbor"
leasing, transactions very similar to the outright sale of depreciation
allowances and investment credits on new investments were legalized.3 Aside
from residual legal differences from a system permitting direct transactions
in all such tax benefits, which would have been equivalent to one with a full
loss offset, safe—harbor leasing also had the limitation of being permitted
only with respect to new capital goods. While this iy have been intended as
a way of targeting the incentives toward new investment, some of the results—3—
werearguably perverse. Companies with tax loss carriyforwards so large as to
make them essentially tax exempt were provided with an opportunity to sell
depreciation deductions and investment credits. While such treatment might
actually have been appropriate under a system which, including interest
deductibility, provides taxable investors with net refunds from investments
in fixed assets, it was not necessarily what was intended by the
legislation, which appeared instead to be aimed at helping those firms that
expected to be taxable in the near future and would otherwise have had to
carry losses forward until such time.
The fact that safe—harbor leasing was scaled back by the 1982 tax
legislation5 demonstrates the ambivalence of legislators toward attempts at
introducing elements of a loss offset into the tax system. Indeed, it is the
perceived heterogeneity of firms incurring losses that helps explain this
ambivalence. Are firms with tax losses "risk takers" with unfavorable
currentdraws, or are they "losers," inefficiently managed companies with low
expected earnings? There appears to be a perception thatthetax law should
penalize the latter type, perhaps to encourage a change of management, but
notthe former. One may interpret the current system of allowing losses to
be carried forward as a compromise between these two objectives. Firms
anticipating a high expected return, but with the prospect of occasional
losses, may lose a year's interest on such losses by having to carry them
forward, or perhaps (through carrying them back) none at all, while those
anticipating runs of losses will suffer substantially more, in the limit_14—
recouping none of the losses carried forward. Hence, one would imagine the
latter type of firm facing a greater discouragement to invest than the
former.
Aside from the fact that penalizing losses is not necessarily the
optimal'waytodistinguish between high—risk, high—return firms and
low—return firms,this analysis becomes even less appropriate under the
currenttax system, where the tax base of a firm differs substantially from
measures of its economic income. Even more fundamentally wrong with this
approachis that it applies to initial decisions firms make. While the high
probability of a tax loss may discourage the low—return firm from investing
initially, once the investment is sunk and, with some probability, the tax
loss occurs, further investment decisions will be made taking account of the
loss carryforward.Sincesuch accumulated tax losses decay in value over
time,firmsmay increase their investment to use them up. Thus, in analyzing
the effect of such a tax system on a firm's behavior, we must account not
only for the firm's decisions, given its current tax position, but we must
also ascertain what this position is likely to be. A "loser" may suffer more
from the absence of a loss offset, but may also be more likely in a position
toaccelerate investment to use up loss carryforwards.
The purpose of this paper is to present a dynamicanalysisof the impact
oftaxation on investment when gains and losses are treated asymmetrically in
the manner described above. For simplicity, our main focus is on two tax
systems that, with a full loss offset, would both be completely neutral in-.5-.
the sense of not distorting investment decisions: an income tax with
interest deductibility, and one without an interest deduction but with the
immediate expensing of investment.6 These tax systems both result in the
taxation of pure economic rent, and differ only in the timing of tax
parments. This distinction turns out to be very important in the current
context. These tax systems are also of interest because the current U.S. tax
system has elements of each: acceleration of depreciation allowances, and
the partial deductibility (only to the extent that debt finance is used) of
the opportunity cost of funds.
After introducing the model and its notation, we analyze the effects of
these tax systems on the behavior of firms with different characteristics,
first in a static, two—period context, and then in an infinite horizon
model. We also sixmilate the stochastic steady states generated bythe
behaviorof firms with an infinite horizon. Our results indicate that, for
anincome tax with interestdeductibility or, more simply, an income tax, the
intuitionpresented above is correct: firms with a greater probability of
loss are less likely to invest, given a small loss carryforward, but also
morelikely to have a large loss carryforward. In the simulated stochastic
steady states, the ultimate iact is perverse inthesense that, onaverage,
suchfirms invest more than others. This result suggests that a potential
improvement is available through the introduction of an option to "cash in"
losses at a discount, for this encourages self—selection on the part of firms
most likely to over invest. Simulations of such a tax system confirm this.—6—
Finally, the behavior of firmsundera system of income taxation with
expensing or, more simply, a cash flow tax, is complicated by the timing of
deductions, and it is less clear what the ultimate impact of the tax system
is on the relative behavior of different types of firms.
II. The Model
Weuse the simplest type of model thatallows us to study the problems
ofinterest.Firms make investment decisions in each period, and these
investments deliver a stochastic return in the following period only. Hence,
depreciation is complete after one period. We also assume that each firm
faces the same investment choices every period, and that the uncertainty is
summarized by a multiplicative random variable that is independently and
identically distributed over time, with unit mean. Thus, we have ruled out
the possibility of previous investment decisions or return realizations
affecting current behavior, except through any tax loss carried forward. If
is the investment at the beginning of period t, then the return at the end
of period t, after depreciation, is
=x(I.)e.
—B Ci)
where x(.) is concave, O is the realized value of the random variable (not
known to the firm when is chosen) and B may be thought of as the firm's
fixed operating costs. We assume x(.) is constant over firms and over time,
and let B vary across firms to represent differences in overall operating
efficiency. In the absence of taxation, B will not influence investment—7—
decisions. This is a very simple way of capturing differences among firms;
one could imagine a model with differences being multiplicative, rather than
additive, or a combination of the two.
We ignore limited liability, and assume that the firm's opportunity cost
is the safe interest rate, r, and that the firm's objective is to maximize
the present value of expected profits. This objective function is in
contrast to the normal use of a concave utility function to study taxation
and risk—taking. However, our interest here is not in the impact of
risk—taking on the bearing of undiversifiable social risk, but rather on the
effects of tax law asymmetries on the behavior of particular firms.One may
imagine much of the current problem going away ifall firms mergedand pooled
their risks; increased merger activity has, in fact, been cited as a
potentialresponse to the current tax law. For arr individual firm in the
present nxdel, the asymmetric treatment of gains and losses imparts a
concavity to the objective function in terms of before—tax returns, since a
greater fraction of losses than gains is received after taxes.
In the absence of taxes, the representative firm's objective at time 1







where W. =— rIis economic profit at the end of year t. Since
I >0,is not a function of this leads to the decision to nximize
current profits. Since E(e) 1, this yields the decision rule:—8—
x=r (3)
i.e., that the marginal product should equal the interest rate.
III. Systems of Taxation
As stated above, either an income tax(with interest deductibility) or a
cash flow tax would, with a full loss offset, result in a tax on economic
rent. This is quite easy to see in the current model. Under an income tax,
the tax base at the end of period t would be W., which equals economic
profit. Under a cash flowtax,the firmwoulddeduct its initial investment,
at the end of period t—l, for an equivalent deduction of (l+r)It at the
end of period t, from the tax base of gross rents, before depreciation and
interest, + I' again leading to W.
Once losses are not usable to obtain a tax refund, these results break
down. To preserve sinlicity, we ignore the possibility of carrying losses
back, and assume that losses may be carried forward indefinitely. Neither of
these assumptions should affect the qualitative nature of the results
derived. To separate the indirect impact of lump—sum rent taxation from the
effects of the tax law asymmetryitself,we assume that the tax system is one
in which positive taxable income is taxed at a zero rate, while negative
taxable income is taxed at a negative rate, —r. This is equivalent to
combining a symmetric, nondistortionary subsidy at rate T with a tax without
lossoffset at the same rate.
Wefirst consider the problem facing a. firm in some arbitrary period t,—9—
underanincometax, letting Lt be the accumulated loss carried forward from
period t—l. The firm's decision at t affects the value of the loss carried
forward into period t+l, and hence the present valueofexpected future
after—taxreturns, so one can no longer separate the problem into a series of
independent one—period decisions. The firm seeks, at time t, to maximize:
V(L) (l+r)Et[Wt +Vt+1(Lt1)] ()
subjectto the choice of where is the current after—tax return. The
expressions for W1 and L+1 depend on whether current period profits are
sufficient to use up the entire taxlosscarryforward. If they are, income
is positive and hence taxable (at rate zero, in this case) at the margin, and
the loss carried forward is not influenced by marginal changes in I• This
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Thecash flow tax is more complicated to analyze because current
decisions affect not only taxable income at the end of the period, at time t,
but also at the beginning of the period, at time t—l. It is useful,
therefore, to define the variable Lt as the tax loss carried forward from
period t—l, before account is taken of period t's investment and potential
expensing deductions. Moreover, period t investment can be expensed at t—l
only to the extent that the tax base is positive at t—l. Hence, we must
include the period t—l taxable profit as a state variable at time t, also.
Fortunately, we can do this without introducing a new variable, since there
cannot be both a loss carryforward from period t—1 and a taxable profit in
period t—l. We simply let L take on a negative value equal to the firm's
taxableprofit at t—l, before period t decisions are accounted for, when this
profit is nonnegative. Complications remain in that any positiveexcess
profit,after deductionofinvestment costs at the beginning of period t, is
not carried forward, while losses are. This will require certain additional
notation.
There are three possiblesituations in which the firm mayfind itself
withrespectto its abilityto expense period t investment. Letting I be





Letting =1if L <0and 0 otherwise, and 1 if Lt + > 0and
0 if Lt +< 0,we may rewrite (9)as:
i• =— (i+•Lt) (10)
Since losses incurred in period t—1, after accounting for additional
deductions of investment expense, denoted L, are carried forward only if
positive, we have, using the definition of ,
L=6(L+It) (ii)
If we let Pt be taxable cash flow at time t, before accounting for
decisions at period t+1, we have
=x(I)O +I—B (12)
which equals total investment returns, gross of depreciation, interest and
taxes. As before, there are two possibilities concerning the state of the
loss carried forward into period t+1, Lt+i. Either cash flow, p, exceeds
the loss L, and a profit is carried forward (L+1 <0),or <Land a















whichaccounts for the inmdiate tax on additional losses if not all
investment can be expensed, plus the after—tax receipts under the two regimes
f or net profits at the end of period t, plus the value of losses or profits
carried forward. The important distinctions from the previous case of the
income tax are that there is a direct effect of the firm's decision on taxes
in two periods, and the value function is evaluated for negative as well as
positive values of Lt, which here stands for the loss carried forward into
period t before newinvestment.
The impact on firmbehaviorof these two tax systems, particularly the
latter, is quite complicated. However, muchthatapplies to the general case
maybelearned by considering a two—period model, in which investment occurs
onlyinthe first period, so that the next period's value function V+1(.) is
uniformly zero.
III. Two—Period Analysis
Dropping subscripts for period t, and assuming V1 0, we obtain the
following condition for investment under the incon tax from (8):—13—
1 + jXF(e)de 1 +iF(A)
=r = (15)
1 +f' OF(o)de 1 +TF(A)E(G/6< -
whereF(.) is the cumulative density function corresponding to f(. ).Since
E(e/e <x)E(e) =1,with strict inequality holding as long as F(A) <1,
expression (15) indicates thatinvestmentwill be lower than would be true
under symmetric taxation, or no taxation, with x' approaching r as A, and
hence L1 become quite large. When this happens, the firm is essentially tax
exempt, because the probability is small that it will use up its loss
carryforw-ard in the near future. What is, perhaps, somewhat surprising is
that the relationship between I and L need not be monotonic. Total
differentiation of (15) with respect to L yields:
dl (x'A —r)tF(A)/x 6
x"(l +TF(A))—(x'X—r)tF(A)/x
The denomination of (16) is equal to 2V/I2 and, as required for an optimum,
is negative. Thus, >0if and onlyifx'A >r.A sufficient condition
for this is that A =1,since x' >r.By the definition of A in (5), x )1
if (L +B)exceeds x —Ir(the maximum value of which occurs when x' r).
Thus, a sufficient condition for investmert to increase with the size of the
tax loss carry-forward is that the loss exceed the expected value of'profits,
before tax. For the general case, an increase in L increases the vaLue of 8
at which profits from current investment become taxable, A. Since marginalprofits at this value, x'A —r,may be negative if L is small and there is a
substantial amount of pure rent being collected, an increase in A may
actually subject more expected losses to taxation, rather than shielding
profits, at the margin. This suggests that if only a small amount of risk is
present, the observed range of L may be sufficiently small that I is non—
increasing over a large part of it. As risk increases, the effect of L in
shielding profits dominates the investment decision.
These two possibilities are illustrated in panels (a) and (b) of
Figure 1, which graph f(e)versus0, with a dotted line at 0 =( ,), the
point at which the firm earns a profit at the margin, expost. This value of
0 nnist lie to the left of the mean of the distribution at 0 =1.In panel
(a), rents are sufficiently large, and L sufficiently small, that the firm is
in a net loss position only when it loses money at the margin. Hence an
increase in L, holding I fixed, means that more of its marginal losses are
subject to the discriminating treatment of the tax system. Once A >( -,),
however,all marginal losses are taxed, and some marginal gains are
subsidized. Increases in L, holding I fixed, increase the amount of gains
receiving the subsidy.
To understand how firms with different values of B will behave under the
income tax, we simplynotethat B and L enter symmetrically into (15) through
)..Hence,(16) may also be interpreted as the value of dI/dB, given L. For
values of L satisfying A >1,increases in B will increase investment. With
small losses carried forward, increases in B may decrease investment, by the—15—
Figure 1
The Effect of an Increased Loss Carryforward on
the Incentive to Invest Under an Income Tax
low X: increase in nondeductible losses
(b)








sameargument given above for small values of L. It is in this range that we
are correct in viewing the tax law as discouraging investment by inefficient
firms.
Behavior under a cash flow tax depends on whether current investment is
deductible at the margin, against period t-1 income. The first—order






where, as defined above, 6 =1if L + I > 0, and0 otherwise. Asidefromthis
first—ordercondition, the value of investment mist satisfy the inequality
consistentwith the value of 6. An intermediate solution for I is also
possible, at neither margin, with L +I=0.Here, 6 will lie between zero
andone and may be interpreted as the Lagrange irultiplier of the constraint
that L + I=0.We review these three cases in turn.
Casel: 6=0(L+I<0)





Since a is not a function of L, this solution is invariant
with respect to L, for all values of L <L,where I +L=0.In addition,
investment here will likely exceed the value at which x' =r.From (17.1),
it follows that x' <r ifand only if—17—
1 +x'E(B/O<a)>0 (18)
which says that expected gross marginal returns in the state where a loss is
carried into period t+l are positive. A sufficient condition for this is the
requirement that £ross returns be nonnegative, a rather weak requirement.
This result says that firms able to expense current investment do better
under the asymmetric tax system. They receive their expensing deduction,
but since gross rents maybenegative, some ofthefirms' marginal gross
rents(which by assumption are always positive) will be sheltered.
Itis straightforward to show thatthe right—hand side of (17.1) must
staythe same or increase with B, holding I fixed, provided that 0 cannot be
lower than —hr. Hence, provided the second—order conditions 'or I are met,
I will increase with B. The situation always corresponds to that for an
income tax with sufficiently high losses. This is because marginal gross
rents cannot be negative.
Case 2: $ =1 (L ÷ I >0)
Here, firms must carry forward marginal expensing deductions. At best,
they can deduct them one period later, as they could under an income tax
without interest deductibility. Hence, in this regime they are even worse
off than under the income tax with a deduction for interest. The first—order
condition (17) becomes:
r(l+T) x — /' 1+TFct)E(0/0<cx
where ci =
B+
L•Not only does the right—hand side of (17.2) exceedr, but
it equals or exceeds the right—hand side of (15) for all values of L and I.
This follows directly from the fact that cx >A.Moreover, the effect of—18—
increases in B or L on I are clear, since the right—hand side of (17.2)
increases (decreases) with either if cx <C>) 0.The intuition is similar to
that applying under the income tax. An increase in the value of cx brings
marginal profits at 9 =cxinto the loss category. These profits (with the
expensing deduction carried forward and subtracted) are x'cx (rather than
x'cx —r,since interest is not deductible). Hence, if cx >0,more profits
are shielded from taxation. If a <0,more tax losses are suffered.
Oase3: (L+I=o)
The derivative of the right—hand side of (ii) with respect to 5, holding
L and I fixed, is strictly positive. Thus, for the appropriate second—order
condition on I satisfied,7 I will decrease withand there will be a unique
solution for I, given L. One of three outcomes will occur:
(1) I+L<Oat=1 (Caselabove)
(2) I+L>Oat=O (Case2above)
(3) I+L=OatO c5 1(Case3)
We may viewas the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint that I +L=0.
It has the interpretation of the fraction of their losses that firms cannot
deductimmediately but must carryforward.
Over the intermediate range of L (for which L mustbenegative as long
asx' +as I +0),investment drops quite sharply, as firms go from a
regime of expensing to one with an income tax.
Summary
The effects of taxation on investment are summarized graphically in—19—
Figure 2. The dotted lines show the effects of increases in B. The
different segments of the cash flow tax may be surnmerized by the values of 6
and 4.When6 =0(Case 1) the firm invests more than in a no—tax world, and
expenses at the margin. As L increases, a transition during with investment
isjust entirely expensed and 6 >0occurs, with I decreasing (Regime 3).
Then,a loss is carried forward into period t, as I +L>0and6 =1,with
investment continuing to decrease with the increase in L until L =0,i.e.,
aslong as=1(Regime 2a) and then increases with L (Regime 2b).
When L is positive, investment is always higher under an income tax although
it may decrease with L initially. Ultimately, as L +, investment
approaches an asyintote at the no—tax value.
In both tax systems, a higher value of B leads to generally higher
levels of investment, for a given value of L. The one exception is for small
values of L under an income tax. Thus, the logic suggesting that inefficient
firms will be discriminated against by tax systems with a loss offset is only
correct under limited circumstances. Moreover, we have yet to determine the
effects of such tax systems when more than one period of investment is
possible. Here, further differences among firms may arise, since tax losses
carried forward from the current period are not simply lost, and the extent
to which they are recouped depends on future decisions.
IV. Response to Taxation in a Multi—Period Model
Once there is a future beyond the present period t, changes in
influence the current investment decision. The first—order condition


























When 0, (19) reduces to (15). Moregenerally,there are two new
effects on the choice of caused by the presence of future decisions:
(1) Since the losses carried forward maybeused to offset future
profits, they are not totally lost. The average value of such
losses is E(V.+1/O <At):
the average marginal increase in the
value function at t+1 with an increase of a dollar in loss carried
forward. The value is bounded above by j--—,since,at best, the
loss carried forward can be used up entirely in the next period.
It is the difference between tandE(V1/O <At)that represents
the penalty for average losses carried forward. We would expect
this value to be larger for firms with lesser prospects for future
profits, since they must wait longer, on average, to use up their
loss carryforwards.
(2) An additional effect relates to the shape of V+1(.). As shown in
the Appendix, V+1(.) is strictly concave for arbitrary t. Thus,
the covariance between and 0 is positive: when 8 is larger, a
smaller loss is carried forward, with a greater prospect of early
recoupment. The impact of this term is to raise the right—hand—22—
side of (19), serving as a correction for the use of the simple
average of V1 in the denominator. Average recoupment of losses
is less than recoupment of average losses.
Taken together, these two effects still do not change the outcome that
x. exceeds r, and that in the limit asL +, x
=r.









which, when V1 0, collapses to (iT).
To analyze the impact of this tax system on investment, we must know the
characteristics of the value function, In the Appendix, we derive the
following characteristics for arbitrary t:
(1) For Lt+i >0,0 < V1 t/(1+r)
(2) For Lt+i <0,—r V1 0
(3) There exists some value of Lt+i, suchthat if Lt+i <
thenV1 =0.
An example of what v1(.) might look like is given in Figure 3. The possible
discontinuity at L =0is not surprising, in light of the fact that L is
really a combination of two separate variables, the loss carried forward,if
positive, and minus the current taxable profit, if negative.Values of L below—23—
Figure 3
Derivatives of the Value Function





L 0 LL correspond to those for which all new investment will be expensed with
profits to spare. Since a small change in profits has no effect on this
outcome, nor on the loss carried forward to the end of the next period,
V' =0.The range of L for which V'0 cprresponds to cases where increases
in L decrease the amount of expensing done, either when I +L=0and I
declines until for unit with increases in L (Case 3 above) or when I +L>0
but L <0,so that some inframarginal investment is expensed (Case 2a above).
Once L >0,increases in the loss carried forward increase the value of the
firm. This is not entirely clear from intuition alone. Although the losses
carried forward provide a shield against future taxes, they also increase the
possibility that firms won't be able to expense future investment. However,
the first effect always dominates the second.
Little more of a qualitative nature can be said about V. However, these
results do allow us to draw certain inferences about investment behavior
under a cash flow tax. For Case 1, in which L +1<0(= 0),investment
still exceeds the no—tax level if gross returns must be nonnegative. We now
demonstrate this.
r —TF()+ E(V' ) t t+l
(20 xt —i+¶F(at)E(O/O
< — E(8V1)






< > (1_F(at))E[V,+i(1+x'e)/e>at] (22)-.25—
Assuming,asbefore, that 1+xO >0for all 0, we know that the left-hand
side of (22) is positive since V1 for e <(L+1
>0),and that the
right—hand side is less than or equal to zero, since V1 0 for 0 >
< 0).
None of the terms on the right—hand side of (20.1) depend onLt. Thus,
again,the solution for given that60is constant, and is an
equilibrium as long as the constraint that Lt +( 0is satisfied. Above
the value of Lt, Lt, for which this constraint is just satisfied, the only
equilibriumcan be with + 0.As before, we can find the equilibrium
byletting6 increase until either Lt += 0,or 6 =1with L +still
greater than zero. This procedure requires that the right—hand side of
(20.1) increases with 6, so that, if the second—order condition for is










Since t/(1+r) for 0 <' aridV.1 0 for 0 >at,'frispositive,
as required.
Thus, we again have a range over which declines, starting from a
value exceeding the no—tax level. When 6 =1,(20) becomes:
— r(1+T) (20 2) X—
1+TF(at)E(0/0<)— E(ev1)
It is difficult to characterize the behavior of investment in this regime,
except to say that, as L +, investmentstil. converges to the no—tax level,—26--
as F(s) +1and V1 +0.We cannot, for example, rule out values of
investment in excess of this level. To gain further insights, simulation
analysiswill behelpful.
V.Simulation Results
In this section, we present simulation results for firms subjec,t to each
ofthe tax systems analyzed above. We also study a variant of the income tax
that permits self—selection by firms. Our focus is on the behavior of firms
with an infinite horizon, and we consider the properties of the stochastic
steady states these firms converge to in their behavior. In particular,
after we have solved for the level of investment a firm will choose in
response to each level of the loss carryforward, we usethis decision rule to
generate a steady state probability distribution for thefirm's loss
carryforward. This, in turn, allows us to calculate the expected valueof
the firm's investment level in the steady state, a measure of the long—run
1nact of taxation on the firm. In the absence of the asymmetrictreatment
of gains and losses, both the income tax and the cash flow tax would have no
effecton investment, which would be the same across firms and across states
of nature.
Themethod of solution for a firm's infinite horizon behavior comes from
the fact that we can interpret the expressions for firm value in(1) and (i4)
as functional equations napping one element of the space ofvalue functions
defined on L into another. For example, for the income tax equation(14)
definesthe mapping:—27—
TV(L) =max(1+r)E[W(L,e,I) +V(max(O,L—W(e,I)))] (2I)
I 0
from the space S ={V(.)} into itself. The class of functions T is bounded,
since the firm cannot have value greater than it would with sufficient
carryforwards to offset all future profits, and cannot be worth less than its
value if it simply chose not to invest. Further, they satisfy Blackwell's
sufficient conditions for a contraction mapping, namely8
Monotonicity: For V, V' c 5, V(L) V*(L)L+TV(L)TV*(L)
This follows from the fact that we may fix the investment function 1(L)
at the value defined by the mapping T of V(L), 1(L), and consider the
mapping T from S into itself holding 1(L) =1(L).Clearly, TV(L) =TV(L)
Moreover, since W(L,o,I(L)) is the same, given any L and 0, and
V*(max(O,L_W(O,I(L)))) 'V(xnax(O,L—W(0,I(L))))for any L and 0,
TV(L)Tv*(L).Finally, since 1(L) is not fixed under T,
Tv*(L)TV*(L).
Discounting: T(V(L) +a)=TV(L)+a,for <1.Here,=(l+r).
Because T is a contraction mapping, of modulus (l+rY, it has a unique
fixed point T: V +V,that can be solved for recursively using the fact
that, for the norm defined as the maximum difference among
elements of two vectors,
IITV—VH =IITV—TVII lIV—VH (25)
That is, the greatest distance from the equilibrium decreases at
least by a factor of (1+r) with each iteration. We may solve for
v(.) by beginning with the value function obtained from the two—period-.28—
model above, and working backward. The economic interpretation of
this is that we are solving for the value function of a problem with
a T period horizon, and letting T +. (Asimilar analysis holds for
the cash flor tax.)
For our actual simulations, we solved in each period for the function
V(.) over a grid of size 200 for L, with I also taking one of 200 possible
values. The parameters for each grid were based on different upper and lower
bounds for each, depending on the problem. In practice, we assumed a fixed
point had been reached when the entire investment function1(L) remained
constant over an iteration, since very small changes in 'i(.) continued to
occur for many more iterations.9
The values for r and r in all simulations were .5 and .3, respectively,
the former chosen as a realistic value, the latter because by our assumption
of imndiate capital decay after one period, a period should be thought of as
lasting longer than one year. In addition, of course, larger values of r
lead to faster convergence of the algorithm.
The payoff function used was x(I) =5Iwhile the distribution of e was
assumed to be uniform, ranging from (2—C) to C, with f(e) =2(1—CY
For all
results reported in the paper, a value of C =5was used. Finally, to
represent firm differences, we performed simulations for B =5and B =15.
Obviously, these values are arbitrary, and are intended simply to illustrate
the patterns possible for the infinite horizon model.
The results of these simulations for both income and cash flow taxes are—29—
graphed in Figure 4.Qualitatively,they are exactly like those shown in
Figure 2 for the two—period model. For positive values of L, the income tax
always leads to more investment, with a higher value of B leading to more
investment under each system, except where I decreases with L, for small
positive values of L. For the cash—flow tax, with L negative, investment is
initially substantially above the no—tax investment level of 69.14, dropping
sharply once the constraint on expensing becomes binding, and eventually
rising but lower than under the income tax. It is reassuring how similar
those findings are to those predicted by the static model.
With the results of these simulations, we can also solve for the
probability distribution of L in the stochastic steady state. The method
used is to solve recursively for the probability distribution over the grid
defined for L by taking an initial guess for some period and solving for the
resulting distribution in the next period, doing so until a stationary
probability distribution is reached, i.e., where the probability distribution
for L is the same from one period to the next. This, along with the decision
rule for investment, defines the stochastic steady state.
These steady state probability distributions for L under each of the
four simulations graphed in Figure 14 are shown in Figure 5•lO For the income
tax simulations, L cannot be negative and there is a probability mass at
L =0.Not surprisingly, the means of the distributions for the inefficient
firm (B =15)lie to the right of those for the efficient firm (B =5).From
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under each tax system, the probability is concentrated where investment is
lowest. For the income tax, the shift in the distribution as B increases
seems clearly to favor investment by the inefficient firm.Thedecline in I
forsmall values of L is very small conxpard to increases thereafter.
Indeed,the expected values of investment for the high—B and low—B firms are
52.7 and b6.3, respectively, compared to a no—tax investment level of 69.)4.
Underthe cash flow tax, on the other hand, the effect of the distribution
shift as B changes is much less clear, since the investment function is much
more nonnonotonic in the relevant range. The firm with high B is more likely
to have a big loss carryforward, which encourages investment. This is
comparable to the effect of the income tax. In addition, however, such a
firmismuch less likely to be able to expense all or part of its investment,
which discourages investment. In the end, these two effects nearly cancel,
as investment averages 56.1 when B =15and 56.0 when B =5.
The rather perverse result that inefficient firms contract less than
efficient ones in response to income taxation is due to the fact that they
are more likely to have big loss carryforwards, and hence the incentive to
increase investment to use these losses up before they decay. A revision of
the tax system (suggested in Auerbach, 1982b) that might change this outcome
without having to rely on information about the firm's characteristics
would be the introduction of an option for firms to cash in their loss
carryforward at anytime,for a discount. The logic is that,oncelosses are
cashed in, firms lose the incentive to increase investment. Moreover, one—33—
would expect inefficient firmstocash in at lower values of L, since they
would expect to have to wait longer to use their accumulated losses up.
Thus,wewould expect the system to have a greater impact on the firms with
highB. A further inact on all firms would be the increase, at low values
of L, in the amount of investment, since losses incurredwould nowhave a
lowerbound on the extent to which they could be recouped. Thus, we would
expected a flattening of the investment schedules shown in Figure 14•
All of these predictions are satisfied in our simulations. Letting p
equal the value at which all losses can immediately be taken (p '(l+r)),
we simulate optimal behavior for infinite horizon firms and the resulting
probability distributions for L. This involves calculating the value of L at
which cashing in becomes worthwhile. Since cashing in involves a reduction
in the loss carried forward from L to zero, the value of L at which cashing
in becomes worthwhile is defined by the equality:
prLV(L)—V(O) (26)
where,of course, v(.)differsfrom earlier simulations in reflection of the
changein the tax system.We have assumed uniqueness for the values of L so
defined, inoursimulations. ble 1showsthe effect of changes in pfor
B =5 andB =15.
As pincreases,each type of firmchoosesto cash in its loss
carryforward at a lower value of L. This is because the cost of doing so
becomes sufficiently small that only relatively small tax losses, which the—34—
Table 1
Income Tax with Option
B=5 B=].5
p 1(0) Pr(L0) Lmax 1(0) T Pr(L0) Lmax
0 38.9I6.3 .28 36.1 52.1 .16
.25 38.913.6 35 133 36.111.2 .31 361
.039.612.9 •1I 229 38.2 113.1 .113 200
• 41I.1&115.6 .61 108 1411.14 115.3 .69 88—35—
firm can expect to work off quickly, are carried forward. The high—B firm
always chooses a lower cash—in value for L, denoted Lrnax, than the low—B
firm, and the probability of its having no loss to carry forward increases
morerapidlywith p, until it is more likelr to have a zero carryforwardfor
p =.55. Asp increases, there are offsetting effects on the average value
ofI for each firm,denoted.Thedistribution of L shifts towardzero, but
theamount of investment for low values of L, such as the value at L =0
shown in the table, increases. The net effect is not monotonic, as !first
falls then, as the tax system approaches one with full loss offset, rises.
As suggested, the difference between average investment for low—B and high—B
firms declines until, at p =.55,the efficient firms invest more, on
average.
VI. Conclusions
The results in this paper, both analytical and from simulation,
demonstrate the importance of the asymmetric treatment of gains and losses
under otherwise neutral tax systems, and enhasize how tax systems that are
similar in the presence of a loss offset become quite dissimilar in the
absence of one. Under an income tax with interest deductibility, the lack of
loss offset discourages investment, with the problem most severe for small
positive values of a tax loss carryforward. As the tax loss carryforward
increases, the problem disappears, as firms become, essentially, tax exempt.
The presence of high fixed costs, by king firms more likely to have large—36--
taxlosses carried forward, leads to greater expected investment in the
simulated steady states.
Under a system of expensing, similar analysis applies to situations in
which firms must carry losses forward. However, when they have sufficient
profits to offset the deduction for current investment, firms actually invest
more than they would in the absence of taxation or with a perfect loss
offset. This is because while current costs are deductible, future gross
rents, in expected value, are not necessarily taxable, at the margin. The
firms most likely to be in this position are those with low fixed costs.
Hence, there is an offset to the encouragement of high fixed cost firms to
invest relatively more, and in our simulation results these two effects are
essentially offsetting.
The pattern of investment under a system of expensing is helpful in
explaining some of the ambivalence and confusion surrounding the recent
debate over safe—harbor leasing. In terms of the current analysis, the
problem lay in giving firms the ability to expense current investment, while
stillcarrying pre—existing losses forward. For companies with losses caused
onlyby theinvestment deductions, this would lead to their being like
companiesfor which, in our model, 6 =0(L +I<0).However, for companies
already essentially "tax—exempt," this would permit more investment than
in the absence of taxation. In our model, this would lead to a marginal
product x' =r(l—t)in the limit and, for the payoff function used in our
simulations, to a level of investment four times as big as in the no—tax-.37—
situation.Hence, transferability of investment incentives for such firms
wouldcause them to invest xre than profitable firms. It must benoted,
however, that the coexistence of interest deductibility and the expensing
deduction makes this less clear, since profitable firms get further potential
taxbenefits, while those with large losses do not.11
The fact that firms with high fixed costs will generally invest more
under an income tax relates, in part, to their lower probability of using up
loss carryforwards in the near future. These losses have lower value to the
firm, presenting a lower opportunity cost to trying to use them up. This
intuition suggests that giving all firms a choice to exchange their
accumulated losses for a discounted payment will encourage the less efficient
firms to "cash in" at lower values ofaccumulated loss carryforwards, and our
simulations supportthis conjecture. Roughly speaking, the choice nchanism
serves to separate firms by type, with those who would increase investment
more in response to losses being more likely to cash the losses in, instead.
The outcome in the simulations is that, for a sufficiently generous exchange
offer, firms with low fixed costs will actually be expected to invest more
than high fixed cost firms in the steady state. If the ultimate aim of the
tax law's asymmetry is to drive inefficient firms out of business or, in the
current context, reduce their scale of operations (and, perhaps, encourage a
takeover by the management of the sore efficient firm), this type of
provision seems helpful, although the problem is less apparent when the tax
law provides for expensing.—38-.
Ifit is not the intention of those who make the tax laws to penalize
inefficient firms, then it is not clear whythecurrent system is to be
preferredto one with a loss offset or, equivalently, one with a provision
allowing losses to be carried forward indefinitely with interest.—39—
Appendix
In this appendix, we demonstrate results about the shape of the value
functionv(.)under both income and cash flow taxes that are asserted in the
text.
Income Tax
The value functionunder an income tax is concave. This is proved by
backwards induction.
By the envelope theorem, we obtain from (8):l2
V =(l+r)[tff(e)do +fV1f(e )de] (Al)












+ftvn f(O)dO — (t—V1(O)) (A3)
or V"(l+r) =[ab
—f +f f(6)d8 —b
where
f(A
a(x'xt_r); b = (T —v1(o)) (An)—40—
Total differentiation of the first—order condition (19) withrespectto








The denominator of (A5) equals 92V/aI2. Under the assumption that <0,
it too must be negative, since tV.41,
b >0,and since the term multiplied
by x equals the denominator of the right—hand side of (19) (the numerator of
which is positive), which must be positive since x. ' 0.
Combining (A3) and (A5), we obtain, after a few steps:
A A
• D =x(1+ft( ,)of(e)de)(ftv1r(e)do —b)
A
—bftVn( —(x'e—r))2f(e)dO
A A 2 A
+ItV1f(O)de .f(x.e—r)v1f(e)d8 —(ft(x.B_r)V1f(O)d8)2
where D <0is the denominator of (A5). Hence, V. <0if the right—hand side
of (A6) is positive. The firsttwoterms clearLy are. Dividing the third
A 2
term through by the positive term (I tV1f(9)de) yields a term that maybe
Interpreted as the variance of the variable (x'e —r)with probability
V1f(O)
t
density function A defined over the interval (—ci',At).Hence,
I tfl F(e)de t+l
it too must be positive, and <0+< 0._14 ]
To show that <0,where 0, it is sufficient to note that the
foregoing arguments hold for V1 0, and hence for =0.
Cash Flaw Tax
Here, we desire to, show that
(i) For Lt >0,0 V i/(1+r)
(2) For Lt< 0, —T<V 0
(3) For some value of Lt, £ <0,L <V
=0
We again proceed by induction. The general formula for V. is, by the
envelope theorem, from (114):




Clearly,if Lt is less than that value at which the solution for
given 6 =0,satisfies +L
<0,then 6 =0and =0.If 6 * 0, the
maximum value of the term multiplied by (l+r)' in (AT) occurs when =0
for 8 > (since <0and V÷1 0) and =— for8 <a.The
minimum value occurs if V÷1 —r, for 8 >a,and 0 for 8 <cx.Thus,
for Lt <0(=1,06 < 1), the maximum value of is
+(1+r)-ft(1-—)f(e)de)]<0 (A8)
while the minimumvalueis
+(i+rY(t-ftf(O)de -fTf(e)de )} >- (A9)
ForLt




For the final period, V = + (l+r)fif(e)dO]. This is clearly
zero if=0,negative but greater than —tifis less than or equal to 1
and 4 =1,and positive but less than j—if 0 and=0.—' 3—
Footnotes
1. See Cordes and Sheffrin (1981).
2. This resulted from a combination of depreciation allowances and
investmer3t tax credits that were nre generous than immediate expensing.
See Auerbach (1982a).
3. See the descriptions in Auerbach (1982a) and Warren arid Auerbach (1982?.
1. See footnote 11 and the related text.
5. SeeWarrenand Auerbach (1983).
6.Theseresults are well—knpwn for the certainty case (see King (1975),
for exanple) and are easily extended to the case of uncertainty. By
interest deductibility, we mean a deduction for the opportunity cost of
funds, regardless of the form of finance.
7. This condition is thatisnegative in the relevant range, not just
locally at the optimum. We assume this condition holds throughout the
following analysis.
8. See the discussion in Lucas, Prescott and Stokey (1983).
9. Further details available from the author on request.
10. The graphs in Figure 5 are smoothed versions of the actual solutions,
which, because of the discrete grid, have small wiggles in them. The
means shown are based on the actual solutions.
11. Calculations in Warren and Auerbach (1982) suggest that in the absence
of uncertainty, the transfer of incentives through safe—harbor leasingfell short of providing "tax exempt" firms with the same incentive to
investas fully profitable one, assuming complete debt finance, i.e. the
deductibility of interest.
12. Note that it is imudiately clear by induction on (Al) that 0._.14 5
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